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Natural Law – A Libertarian View 
Anthony D’Amato  
“In the subjugating of humans, attitudes are more powerful 
than armaments.”1  
INTRODUCTION 
I offer in this essay a radically old way of thinking about the 
proper limits of law. The theory and practice of natural law were 
worked out in ancient Greece and Rome before organized religion co-
opted it. The attractiveness of that classic system was the public’s atti-
tude that natural law is limited law; it extends only to the edge of so-
ciety’s needs. Beyond that edge is no-law. The imaginary sphere of 
privacy around a person’s body may be referred to, under natural law, 
as a law-free zone.  
This idea of law running out when it reaches our sphere of priva-
cy is strange to us today because we are thoroughly immersed in the 
positivist conception of law. Positive law is boundless; it extends to 
infinity in all directions.2 Law penetrates the sphere of privacy if the 
commander wants to regulate private acts. Libertarians who abhor the 
idea of big government elongating its tentacles into the private lives of 
citizens may overlook the fact that it was positive law that paved the 
way. Once legal jurisdiction has extended into the private sphere, big 
government does not lag far behind. Government quickly fills up the 
formerly private sphere by enacting a dense thicket of regulations. 
Before continuing with the story of natural law and positive law, 
let us take up, in a relatively informal way what we mean by law. In a 
moment of existential clarity I assert that law is nothing other than 
strangers telling me what to do. They threaten to punish me if I don’t 
do what they command. How can it be that I, a person who was born 
free and deserving of no less consideration than any other human be-
ing, find myself on a planet where other people are telling me what I 
must do and are ready and able to seriously harm me if I refuse? 
                                                                                                                           
 1 BEN HECHT, PERFIDY 43 (1961). 
 2 Positivism holds that all legal rules are the commands of society’s commander-in-chief; 
since a commander can command anything, there is no limit to the scope of the command. 
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In search of an answer, we must go back to when we first realized 
that other people were ordering us around.  
LAW IN THE FAMILY 
Without knowing words like law and manipulation, you and I be-
gan to realize around the age of three that our parents were manipu-
lating the living daylights out of us. Do this; don’t do that. Do not play 
in the street, do not hit your younger sibling, do not throw food. Rules, 
regulations, laws, ordinances, and norms all seem to have been in-
vented at the drop of a pacifier. And how efficiently did our parents 
calibrate the punishment that would fit our crimes: no television to-
night, no dessert, pick up the toys, bedtime in one hour! 
We first interpreted what our parents told us to do as “com-
mands” or “orders” even though we did not know those words either. 
Since our parents’ commands were always interfering with what we 
felt like doing at that moment, we believed we had every right to dis-
obey their commands when they were not looking. It took us several 
years to realize that we should obey the commands even when our 
parents were not watching us because those commands served us well. 
This is when the idea of “command” in our minds morphed into the 
idea of “law.” A law was something that lodged itself in the rational 
part of our brain, blocking our ability to find reasons to disobey it.  
But we also began to see something very attractive about law. 
Unlike commands which could be arbitrary and ad hoc, laws carried 
with them a sense of equality, fairness, and reciprocity. Johnny steals a 
cookie from the pantry; his mother catches him and cuts off his televi-
sion for that evening. But Johnny, who has learned something about 
law, points out that when Freddie stole a cookie, she gave him a 
second chance. “All right,” says the mother if she is wise, “since this is 
the first time for you, I’ll give you a second chance. But don’t do it 
again.” 
Our parents’ commands became law for us because we trusted 
them to act in our best interests and to apply the laws equally and 
without discrimination. We realized that we were getting the free ben-
efit of our parents’ greater knowledge and worldly experience.3 They 
were training us for a time when we would be on our own. They were 
                                                                                                                           
 3 I’ve couched this argument in voluntaristic terms where more extended analysis shows 
that the entire procedure is Darwinian. Nurturing children is a survival mechanism for the family. 
Parents have been selected for their proclivity to lay down laws for the family that enhance the 
family’s fitness for survival. 
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on our side against all the evils and dangers of the world. We accepted 
their dictatorship because we realized that they truly cared for us.4    
THE JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF PUBLIC LAW 
When we left home at some point in our teenage years, we en-
countered a new set of regulations that replaced the old family law. 
But there was a striking difference: we quickly learned that public 
officials enact laws designed to benefit themselves. If some laws also 
benefit us, it is a mere side-effect. Public legislators and bureaucrats 
enact rules to help their families, relatives, friends, cronies and cam-
paign contributors. 
When they are not directly helping themselves and their friends, 
legislators have a tendency to power-trip their way into broad-ranging 
paternalism. They enact legislation that does things like criminalizing 
victimless interactions, banning movies or other forms of entertain-
ment on the Sabbath, banning pornography, forbidding the intake of 
drugs, placing obstacles in the way of divorce and adoption, listening 
in on people’s telephone calls, and intruding in many other ways into 
people’s privacy. Although these statutes have the same look, feel, and 
enforcement potential as ordinary statutes, you and I have in re-
serve—though we don’t bring up that reserve—to refuse to dignify 
them by the name “law.” Someday perhaps the public will learn to 
distinguish true law (natural law) from the intrusive rules that wear 
law’s mask. 
WHY NATURAL LAW DESERVES RESPECT  
So far I have argued that society makes many laws that redound 
to its own benefit—maintaining and securing itself through time. You 
and I profit from a well-functioning society. We can take advantage of 
schools, museums, the theatre, films, social clubs, opera, golf courses, 
sports stadiums, shopping malls, highways, national parks, concert halls 
and outdoor concerts,. Moreover, economies of scale make it possible 
for society to provide 24-hour police and firefighter services, taxis, 
hospitals and emergency rooms, and ambulances. Every member of 
society benefits from a standing army and navy that protect society 
from foreign enemies or sudden aggression. Our obligation to obey 
society’s laws--which as Socrates said occurred at the time when we 
                                                                                                                           
 4 This benign sequence of events presupposes good parents. Matters would be quite dif-
ferent under abusive parents, where children grow up learning to distrust all parental orders and 
laws, a distrust they carry with them into the outside world where they may join gangs, engage in 
theft, and deal in drugs. 
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were free to leave the society but chose to remain—is the flip side of 
our acceptance of the gains and benefits we derive from society.5 
Thus as we step out into the wide world we should draw a distinc-
tion between rules that benefit society (and for that reason help you 
and me indirectly), and those that go beyond society’s need, paterna-
listically intruding upon our private acts. John Stuart Mill, in the clas-
sic manifesto of libertarianism, spelled out that very distinction.6 
Mill drew a line between self-regarding acts and other-regarding 
acts. The latter are acts that directly infringe upon the rights or specific 
interests of others. Natural law prohibits many other-regarding acts by 
providing punishment for their disobedience. But what is the actual 
content of natural law? On several occasions I researched this ques-
tion only to find that authors avoided bringing it up. Eventually I 
came to the realization that if the general rules of natural law were 
universally known their its content should not be a mystery. The most 
general of all the general rules of natural law, I realized, was this: that 
in every case, the judge tries to figure out, on the basis of the totality 
of the evidence, which party took unfair advantage over the other par-
ty. The party that took unfair advantage will lose the case. The me-
chanisms of taking unfair advantage is just the list of natural law pro-
hibitions: murder, kidnapping, arson, rape, assault and battery, theft, 
burglary, breach of contract, cheating and fraud, and failure to repay a 
debt.7 In addition, a free man was required to contribute to the fortifi-
cation and defense of the society against external enemies, a civic duty 
which included the payment of taxes. All these rules, duties, and pro-
hibitions are necessary inferences from the fact that the society has 
survived.8 If we encounter any society and we investigate its laws, we 
will see that they contain all of these natural rules. “Natural” law is an 
inference from the nature of human society. Without those rules socie-
ties would sooner or later self-destruct or be conquered. We can be 
more accurate if we put it in Darwinian terms: societies that are miss-
ing (or not enforcing) one or more of the natural-law prohibitions are 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Anthony D’Amato, Obligation to Obey the Law: A Study of the Death of Socrates, 49 
SO. CAL. L.REV. 1079 (1976) (analyzing social obligations accepted when the decision is made 
not to emigrate). 
 6 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
 7 Although this is not a long list, literally millions of cases can be decided under the aegis 
of these prohibitions. Nearly every real or imagined harm that humans can experience that can 
be traced to human causes (as opposed to disasters of nature) can be reasonably alleged to in-
volve the transgression of one or more of the natural-law prohibitions listed in the text. 
 8 Perhaps the only contingent rule in the set is the prohibition of theft. One might con-
ceive of a communist society where there is no private property and hence nothing to steal. 
However, as far as anyone knows, communism has nowhere succeeded in abolishing personal 
property; individuals hold it with great tenacity. 
2007] Natural Law – A Libertarian View 101 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis all other societies in the competition for a li-
mited space on the planet. They will eventually lose in the struggle for 
survival. 
Rules of natural law are grounded in the firm expectation of re-
ciprocity: thus the prohibition of theft restricts your actions but at the 
same time prohibits others from stealing from you. Or to put it diffe-
rently, one of the benefits you get from living in society is police pro-
tection against theft; you “pay” for this benefit by refraining from 
stealing from others.9 Of course, similar reasoning applies to all the 
rules of natural law. The lowest common denominator of all the rules 
of natural law is that free riding must be eliminated.10 
By contrast, self-regarding acts are those that injure no one ex-
cept possibly the actor. Mill lists gambling, drunkenness, incontinence, 
idleness, and uncleanliness—acts or omissions that society has no 
business regulating. Mill further explains: “No person ought to be pu-
nished simply for being drunk, but a soldier or a policeman should be 
punished for being drunk on duty.” Mill’s language here is almost am-
biguous (surprising for such a great prose stylist). The punishment is 
not quite for “being drunk on duty,” but rather for dereliction of duty. 
The drunkenness itself is a purely self-regarding act, whereas derelic-
tion of duty (whether because of drunkenness or any other causal fac-
tor) is intrinsically other-regarding.11 
The line Mill drew between other-regarding and self-regarding 
acts is the same line that marks the outer boundary of natural law. 
Acts that are lawful under natural law are acts that connect up with 
the needs of society. Social needs include the prohibitions just men-
tioned (“murder, kidnapping, arson, rape, . . ).  A rule that reaches 
beyond societal needs and tries to regulate an individual’s self-
regarding acts is not a law at all.12 It may well be a command, order, 
decree, dictate, edict, mandate, precept, regulation, ultimatum, or 
                                                                                                                           
 9 In a classic argument that reached the deep structure of natural law, Denis Diderot 
wrote in his famous ENCYCLOPEDIA that the thief is also a firm believer in the law against theft. 
After all, once having stolen an item, the thief wants the police to protect his newly acquired 
property against theft by others. In short, what the thief seeks is ownership. He must then realize 
the inconsistency of robbing the original owner of that ownership. Hence he would have to ac-
knowledge the justice of his punishment.  
 10 See ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND 
PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998). 
 11 A parent who refuses for religious reasons to allow her child to receive necessary medi-
cal care is not shielded by her self-regarding sphere. Her failure to act is other-regarding vis-à-vis 
her child and thus is subject to legal intervention.  
 12 A mother cannot lawfully refuse medical care for her child. Her child is not within her 
sphere of privacy (as she may claim) but rather has its own sphere. Courts have uniformly upheld 
the right of the state to give inoculations and immunizations to infants over the objections of 
their parents.  
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ukase. The king may have issued it personally; and it might be backed 
by the full force of the state. But it is not worthy of the title of law.  
We sometimes think of medieval kings as sovereign holders of all 
the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of their states. In fact 
they were not legislators because all the law that was needed was al-
ready present in the unwritten natural law. The kings had power as 
judges to hear cases, but their decisions could not change the natural 
law. And we have seen that they could issue commands or directives, 
but these commands had to comport generally with natural law. While 
it is difficult for us today to believe that a phrase as innocuous as “the 
law of the land” could actually be a constraint upon a king, that was in 
fact the gravamen of the Magna Carta signed and accepted by King 
John in 1215. The signers and witnesses knew that “the law of the 
land” referred to the unwritten immutable principles of natural law. 
For example, consider paragraph 39: 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of 
his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived 
of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with 
force against him, or send others to do so, except by the 
lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land.13  
Thus even though King John embodied the executive, legislative, and 
judicial powers of the kingdom, and even though he was referred to as 
its sovereign, he nevertheless could not make law that would overturn, 
or be contrary to, the law of the land. If the king then issued a com-
mand that a named individual be seized and imprisoned contrary to 
paragraph 39, the king’s subordinates would not be bound by such a 
command and were legally justified in refusing to obey it. The situa-
tion is exactly similar to a soldier’s refusal to obey the command of his 
or her military superior for the reason that the command violates the 
laws of war or would constitute, if carried out, a crime against humani-
ty. 
Consider again the specific prohibitions in paragraph 39. To im-
prison someone is to deprive him of his privacy. To strip him of his 
possessions leaves him without the physical means of defending his 
private life. King John agreed that he had no right to do these things 
except in the execution of a lawful judgment. Natural law of course 
does not protect violators of the law. A criminal’s sphere of privacy 
can be penetrated by the state in order to impose physical punish-
ment. But punishment is only a secondary effect (and a necessary one) 
                                                                                                                           
 13 MAGNA CARTA, para. 39. The phrase is also found in paragraphs 42 and 45. In paragraph 
55 the exact phrase was “the law of the realm,” but the text does not signal any difference in this 
change of one word. 
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of a rule-based order; the primary rules themselves that guide our 
conduct “run out” when they cannot be justified by the needs of socie-
ty. In short, under secular natural law the validity of a legal rule con-
sists of its rational connection to the preservation of society’s interests. 
When I discern such a rational connection, then the rule is like the 
family rules of my childhood, for I am dependent upon society today 
as I was dependent upon my family years ago. When society’s rules 
add to its own protection and preservation, society’s utility for me is 
increased. And like the rules in the family, this (and only this) obliges 
me to obey those rules.14  
CAN THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT US? 
Readers might object that their zone of privacy is protected by 
the United States Constitution and hence we have the functional 
equivalent of a limited natural-law regime. But this objection fails for 
a reason that goes to the heart of natural-law theory. The Constitution, 
cannot protect us against the incursion of law because it is, after all, 
just another law. To deal with this problem and the larger problem it 
implicates—namely, whether natural law and positivism can co-
exist—I will set forth a series of propositions. Some propositions, as 
we shall see, contradict other propositions. A cluster of propositions of 
this sort is called an apory, defined by Nicholas Rescher in an impor-
tant recent book as “a group of acceptable seeming propositions that 
are collectively inconsistent.”15 We begin with three propositions under 
positivist theory: 
(1) The commander’s power is absolute. 
(2) The Constitution places limitations upon the commander’s 
power. 
(3) The two preceding propositions contradict each other. 
The actual words of the Constitution, as the saying goes, can not 
rise from the sheet of paper and grip the commander around the 
throat until he rescinds his unconstitutional command. But what about 
the meanings of those words? Can they rise up from the paper? Do 
they fare better in the struggle for the commander’s mind? 
Every experienced judge or attorney will recognize that words do 
not have a single, fixed, determinate meaning. Even the word “mean-
ing” can mean different things in different contexts (for example, what 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Under natural law, is there also a “duty to warn” a stranger who is in peril? A qualified 
“yes” is defended in Anthony D’Amato, The Bad Samaritan Paradigm, 70 NW. U.L. REV. 798 
(1976). 
 15 NICHOLAS RESCHER, PARADOXES 7 (2001).  
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is the meaning of a metaphor? How literally may we take it?) A 
strong-willed government may even say that the entire Constitution 
changes meaning during a serious national emergency. Consider the 
Japanese Internment Cases of World War II.16 There the Supreme 
Court suspended all the rights of Japanese-American citizens and 
forced them into concentration camps where they had no constitu-
tional protection. This magic trick was rationalized on the basis that in 
rare instances the Constitution has to be violated in order to save it. 
The Japanese-American citizens were deemed a potentially subversive 
group that could aid the Empire of Japan in overthrowing the gov-
ernment of the United States and abolishing the Constitution forever. 
To save the Constitution, their constitutional rights were suspended. 
This kind of maneuver is always available, in some degree, when a 
court decides it must get around a legal barrier.17 All that’s needed is 
apocalyptic thinking—a willingness to exaggerate by several orders of 
magnitude a minor threat to the nation. A current example is the ex-
clusion of combat aliens from habeas corpus protection by the Mili-
tary Commission Act of 2006.18 The Act gives the Executive the power 
to decide the threshold question whether a captured alien is an enemy 
combatant. If the Executive acts in bad faith or makes a mistake, the 
captured person could be detained for years without ever seeing a 
judge or magistrate. This is, of course, what King John did that led to 
the Great Writ of habeas corpus. The rationale? To defeat terrorists 
we must put the Constitution aside.  
Although the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted to establish 
for citizens, at least by inference,19 a zone of privacy, there are two hid-
den logical premises that need to be brought to the surface: 
(4) Legal jurisdiction is universal within U.S. territory. [A basic 
rule in the positivist tradition.] 
(5) The Constitution can establish certain zones of privacy for in-
dividuals by rendering invalid any rules or statutes that attempt 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 
(1943); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U..S. 283 (1944).  
 17 In a talk on Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), given at Northwestern Law School several 
months after the case was decided, Judge Richard Posner acknowledged the unpopularity of 
citing the Korematsu case, but had some good words to say about it anyway. It was a precedent 
for Bush v. Gore in that great popular unrest and agitation could break out if the nation had to 
go several months without a President. Hence it was justified for the Supreme Court to ignore 
the laborious provisions in the Constitution for resolving close elections. 
 18 Military Commission Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006).  
 19 For example, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
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to invade those zones. [so long as the public abides by the Consti-
tution.] 
(6) The two preceding propositions contradict each other. 
By contrast, natural law proceeds as follows: 
(7) Legal jurisdiction is limited to social needs. [Basic rule in the 
natural-law tradition.] 
(8) Zones of privacy are beyond the reach of law. [The public 
simply does not recognize legal jurisdiction as penetrating such 
zones.] 
These premises can be tested by a hypothetical case. A person 
chooses to get drunk in his home. Under present-day constitutional 
law, that person has not committed a crime and hence the law should 
protect his privacy. But we know the law can change. There may come 
a time when getting drunk at home is a misdemeanor. Everyone 
agrees, including the drunkard, that such a change can be effectuated 
by a new interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court. 
Analytically we can say that the law already has jurisdiction over the 
drunken citizen; it simply has not chosen to exercise its jurisdiction at 
the present time, but can change its mind when the Supreme Court 
changes its mind. 
Under natural-law theory, law simply has no force when it ex-
tends beyond the boundary of social need. There can be no law about 
drunkenness at home because “jurisdiction” ends at the outer shell of 
self-regarding acts.  
THE ROLE OF RELIGION 
Many people are troubled by “natural law” because of religious 
overtones. Roman Catholicism has cited natural law in support of its 
ban upon the use of contraceptives, explaining that contraceptives are 
“unnatural.” It reminds them of the intrusions of organized religion 
into our private lives. Roman Catholicism has proclaimed that the use 
of contraceptives is a violation of natural law. There has also been an 
element of antipathy among some Catholics toward homosexuality, 
stemming from St. Thomas Aquinas’s argument that it is “unnatural” 
and hence violates natural law. In this essay I have been talking only 
about secular natural law—that which was worked out by Aristotle, 
Cicero, Justinian, and other Greek and Roman jurists of the classical 
period.  Its theory was complete well before Emperor Constantine in 
the fourth century instituted Christianity as an official religion of the 
Roman Empire. 
Organized religion saw that a vacuum had been created by natu-
ral law: the shell of privacy where law did not and could not intrude. 
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This private sphere was not the concern of the state. People could act 
within the private sphere in complete freedom from the regulations of 
society. But why should people enjoy the luxury of this freedom when 
organized religion could take it away from them? Organized religion 
could assert its jurisdiction over that zone, regulate it (calling it pri-
marily “sins of the flesh”) and count on financial contributions from 
the regulated persons. The parishioners would pay money to the 
church out of shame, guilt, or even (for several centuries) to purchase 
indulgences.20   
Here was an opportunity to greatly enhance the power of the 
clergy. Religion could claim control over the entire sphere of privacy 
without threatening the political establishment. The church could 
“render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,” and yet obtain sove-
reignty over the vast area of human privacy. The church could fill that 
area with rules, regulations and prohibitions; it could provide punish-
ments more horrible than anything the state could dream up: never-
ending pain by burning in hell forever. Religion transformed the free-
dom of its faithful into servitude. When various Protestant groups split 
off from Roman Catholicism, nearly all of them opted in favor of 
preaching even greater restrictions on people’s private lives. For true 
believers, faith varied inversely with freedom.  
WHERE DOES NATURAL LAW COME FROM?  
Natural law proceeds from the bottom up. It is an empirical law 
in the Aristotelian sense: it takes social facts and normalizes them. The 
law then becomes what societies do. However, if everything societies 
did were normalized, the norms would be full of contradictions. For 
example, you could not have laws against murder or theft if murders 
and thefts were included in the social data. One needs a criterion21 of 
selection. Although it would be virtually impossible to program a 
computer with a quantifiable criterion, common sense readily solves 
the problem. Thus, murder if allowed would wipe out society; hence 
murders must be excluded from the data. Theft if allowed would de-
stroy private property; hence it must be excluded. Fraud if allowed 
would disable markets; hence it must be excluded. In short, natural 
laws are society’s protective mechanisms, not knowable a priori. Just 
                                                                                                                           
 20 In the later Middle Ages, The Roman Catholic Church sold temporal remittance of 
after-life punishments. See CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, Indulgences. Martin Luther saw corrup-
tion in this practice, broke away from Catholicism, and initiated the Protestant reformation.  
 21 The term “criterion”, unless carefully defined, could beg the question. Wittgenstein 
analyzed the concept of a criterion and showed—via the later analytical gloss provided by Al-
britton—how circularity could be avoided in specific contexts. See Rogers Albritton, On Witt-
genstein’s Use of the Term “Criterion,” 56 J. PHIL. 845 (1959).  
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like the existence of an animal or plant is a Darwinian success story, 
the existence of a society is evidence that it has maintained and en-
forced a set of internal controls that we call natural law. 
Natural law simply locked into the universal common sense of 
people that the societies that nurture them must be repaid by follow-
ing its internal controls and contributing a share of one’s energy and 
talents to its maintenance. No one was entitled to a free ride. Howev-
er, everyone’s private life was simply external to society.  
THE WORLD’S GREATEST DECEPTION  
Grounded as natural law was in a shared willingness to support 
the society of which one was a member, it is unremarkable that it held 
sway for about the first four millennia of recorded history. Yet it was 
just a mental construct, a popular attitude. The ease in which it was 
displaced is probably the most frightening fact in human history. When 
the people of the world threw out natural law, they discarded the free-
dom that it had protected. They accepted instead a law that could in-
trude upon and regulate their private lives. One might say with Eric 
Fromm that the public escaped from freedom. But the escape was so 
gradual, so unheralded, so little remarked, that scholars did not even 
notice when the revolution was completed.22 Legal positivism’s victory 
is so thorough that even the question of an alternative to it, much less 
the specific natural-law alternative, hardly ever enters anyone’s mind. 
With the rise of parliaments and other legislatures in European 
countries five centuries ago, courts that applied the unwritten natural 
law were increasingly regarded as a captive of the aristocracy opposed 
to the new scientific and industrial revolution. The public increasingly 
turned against judicial decision-making based on a universal natural 
law as being subjective and unscientific. It instead embraced the new 
parliamentary legislation that seemed to serve redistributive justice. 
Positivism’s idea that law is nothing but a command appealed to the 
public as a way of dissolving the uncertain clouds of natural law and 
substituting in their place a written, determinative, democratic series 
of statutes—with the promise that they would soon occupy the entire 
field of law. The law that judges were obliged to apply was now sup-
posed to consist almost entirely of statutory law. The judges were ex-
pected to discard the set of natural laws that Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr. later disparaged as the “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”23 
But the one factor that made it easiest for lawyers, judges, and the 
public to abandon natural law was the fact that legal positivism did 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Eric Fromm, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 36-37 (1941). 
 23 Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.).  
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not create a greater intellectual challenge or a more complex para-
digm than the natural-law theory it desired to replace. Instead, it was 
far easier—intellectually lazier, if I may so characterize it—to em-
brace the far simpler jurisprudential theory of legal positivism. Here 
are the fundamental positions: 
(9) NATURAL LAW: Law is superior to a command. 
(10) POSITIVISM: Law is a command.24 A command can modify 
or delete any law.  
(11) The two preceding propositions contradict each other. 
Thus, if we simply regard all of law as a species of command, we can 
eventually delete (by enacting elaborate legal codes) whatever con-
cepts of natural law may be floating in the air above the hubbub of 
“legal” commands.25 
This maneuver greatly simplifies the law. In fact it simplifies it all 
the way back to the time when we were three years old. Commands 
were a one-way projection of our parents’ authority over us. Their 
commands to a three-year-old mind seemed arbitrary and annoying. 
Suppose, as we grew older, those commands never cohered into a ra-
tional system of laws. Suppose the commands kept coming at us with 
no structure or rationale. Then we would have no idea about what 
“law” could be like. All we would know was that we were on the re-
ceiving end of a barrage of commands. When we ventured forth into 
the real world, we would be bombarded by similarly arbitrary direc-
tives. We would then be living arbitrarily-ruled lives; we would not 
know what it would be like to have our zone of privacy. For a com-
mand can be anything. There is no limit to the scope or coverage of a 
command. The command is whatever rule the commander wants it to 
be.  
                                                                                                                           
 24 Of the four leading legal positivists, Jeremy Bentham regarded law as a command. John 
Austin wrote that law properly so-called is a command. Hans Kelsen wrote that law is a coercive 
order. H.L.A. Hart invoked the image of a gunman in an alley ordering you to hand over all your 
money. He then argued that many qualifications and conditions that the state imposes upon law 
remove it from the image of the gunman situation writ large. The argument, however, does not 
succeed. The command of the gunman remains at the core of Hart’s concept of law. H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 22 (1961). The command theory leads Hart mistakenly to describe 
international law as primitive. For further argument see Anthony D’Amato, The Neo-Positivist 
Concept of International Law, 59 AM. J. INT’L L. 321 (1965). Pertinent excerpts from the volu-
minous writings of Bentham, Austin, and Kelsen can be found in ANTHONY D’AMATO, 
ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY ch. 2 (1990).  
 25 While codification seems to supplant common-law rules in the short term, over the 
longer term the codified rules begin to “unravel” in that they become increasingly problematic. 
There is a kind of positive entropy in legal codification. The full argument is spelled out in An-
thony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
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John Austin, one of positivism’s leading theorists, wrote that laws 
properly so-called are nothing but commands. Law is “set by political 
superiors to political inferiors.”26 International-law scholars associated 
with Yale Law School have taken the position that the United States, 
as the world’s superpower, can enforce its commands against all other 
states and hence makes international law. In discussing international 
law before the American Society of International Law, Professor Mi-
chael Reisman told the overflow audience: “The notion of law as a 
body of rules, existing independently of decision-makers and un-
changed by their actions, is a necessary part of the intellectual and 
ideological equipment of the political inferior.”27 In brief, and taken 
literally, might makes right. 
We have come full circle back to my first definition of today’s 
law: other people telling us what to do and punishing us if we don’t do 
it. By accepting and internalizing the notion of positivism as a com-
mand, we have discarded our defenses against the intrusions of other 
people. When they or their friends become lawmakers with the mighty 
but not necessarily thoughtful power of the state behind them, we are 
easy prey. 
Our personal liberty is not all that we have forfeited to the law. 
We have also given up a level playing field to reduce or eliminate the 
power factor. Assume A is bigger and stronger than B, and they have a 
dispute: 
(12) In a world without law, the stronger party A wins every time 
irrespective of merit.28 
(13) In a world of positive law, A will more likely be a member of 
the lawmaking class than B and hence can steer the decision A’s 
way. 
(14) In a world of positive law, the strongest persons (including 
A) might in the limit set themselves up as masters and enslave 
everyone else.  
(15) In a world of natural law, the dispute will be settled by a 
third party (usually a judge). The more meritorious party (the 
one who least transgresses natural law) will win. 
                                                                                                                           
 26 John Austin, quoted in ANTHONY D’AMATO, ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY 
40 (1990).  
 27 W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, 86 
ASIL PROCEEDINGS 118 (1992).   
 28 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  
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RESOLVING THE PARADOX  
About five hundred years ago the world underwent at a glacial 
pace a profound change of mind-set: from a belief in natural law to an 
acceptance of legal positivism. In doing so the world gave up the idea 
that law was inherently limited and could not apply beyond the needs 
of society. Instead it bought into the idea of law as a command, and 
commands themselves were inherently unlimited. The world accepted 
as commanders the persons who were physically the stronger.  
At this point we should take inventory of the fifteen propositions 
that constitute our apory. We find that consistency among all the 
propositions is impossible; in short, we have a paradox. Rescher advis-
es in cases of paradox that we add new propositions to the cluster in 
hope of finding a way out. But we have an initial difficulty in the case 
where positivism and natural law compete with each other for control 
of the public mind. We need to acknowledge proposition (16): 
(16) When natural law and positivism clash in the real world, po-
sitivism wins. 
(17) Positivism wins in the real world because it employs brute 
force.  
(18) In the world of the intellect (as opposed to the real world), 
the winner of a clash between natural law and positivism rests on 
the attitude of each person. 
Proposition (18) reminds us of the earlier observation in this essay 
that commands are unbounded because the state has the power to use 
physical coercion against persons who violate the state’s commands. 
The state, following positivist theory, calls these commands “law”. But 
the public’s attitude is not amenable to coercion. A person can obey a 
command for reasons of prudence but may harbor a mental reserva-
tion against the command because it seems to be an unjustifiable 
overreaching of society’s rights of maintenance and self-preservation.  
Let us take two societies, X and Y, on extreme ends of a spectrum. 
In X, everyone believes that law is any rule that is enforced by the 
state. In Y, everyone (including the police and the military) believes 
that just because a rule is enforced does not make it “law.” A dictator 
in Y would find himself in the position of King John: that even the 
people closest to him will not carry out certain kinds of commands.29 
                                                                                                                           
 29 As a thought experiment, suppose that the President of the United States is impeached. 
He orders the military to arrest and detain all Senators and Congresspersons. Even though he is 
commander-in-chief, we know almost intuitively that the military services will not obey such an 
order.  
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We do not need to find a real society that is like Y in the above 
hypothetical example. It is sufficient for resoling the paradox that Y is 
conceivable. We end up with: 
(19) Positivism and natural law can coexist if the public is con-
vinced that a command does not necessarily implicate “law,” and 
that “law” does not necessarily implicate a command. 
In the world today, it is an unfortunate fact that most nations are 
bunched up very close to X on the X-Y spectrum¸ and few if any can 
be located near the Y end of the spectrum. There are many years and 
maybe generations to go before people appreciate how much liberty 
they have lost by assuming that all commands issuing from the gov-
ernment constitute the law. We have a long way to go to move nations 
from the X position toward the Y position. But since we are engaged 
in a battle for public attitudes, our consolation is that natural law’s 
weapons in the battle are the forces of rationality, reason, and justifi-
cation. In this interesting sense, writing about natural law can serve 
also as a good way to fight for it. 
 
